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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AG£NCY-ACCOUNTING FOR PROCEEDS OF Ii.LEGAL CONTRACT Of SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.-Following the decision of the United States Supreme
Court that the Wilson Act did not affect interstate shipments of liquor until
final delivery by the carrier, Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 4I2, (,898), Congress
passed the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. at L. 699 (I9I3). .Meantime, in I9I3,
35 Stat. at L. n36, Sec. 239, it was enacted that it should be a penal offense
for any .-:ari'ier or other agent, in connection with the interstate carriage of
intoxicating liquors, to collect the purchase price from the consignee, or in
any manner act as agent of buyer or seller, except in the actual transporta·
tion or delivery thereof. After this act carriers and banks r..:fused to act as
collection agents in such sales, and dealers resorted to the plan of consigning
liquor which had been ordered from prohibition states, to their own order,
mailing the bill of lading to an agent, with instructions to deliver the same
upon payment of the accompanying draft by the purchaser. In Da11ciger v.
Cooley, U. S. Supreme Court, Adv. 0. I39, Jan. 7, I9I9, it was held that this
was ih violation of Sec. 239, supra, and of course illegal. The shipment was
made before I9I3, and so did not involve the Webb-Kenyon Act.
The Kansas Supreme Court, g8 Kan. 38, 484, from which this case was an
appeal, had decided that the transaction was an illegal sale, and therefore the
principal could not collect from the agent the proceeds of the violation of the
law. On this point the Federal Court held the right of a principal to recover
such money from an agent was a question of local law and could not be reexamined by the court.
It is a general rule that an agent cannot dispute his principal's title, and
this is so even when the agent seeks to set up the illegality of the transaction.
He cannot for that reason steal the money and set his principal at defiance.
Baldwin Bros. v. Potter, 46. Vt. 402. But the courts are not in agreement on
this matter, especially where the principal is engaged in a business that is
against the public policy of the State. Mexican Int. Banking Co. v. Lichtenstein, IO Utah 338 (a lottery business). The Kansas court agrees with this
view and does not limit it to cases involving public policy. Alexander v.
Barker, 64 Kan. 3g6..
BILLS AND NoT£S-C£RTIFICAT£S OF D£POSIT.-A certificate of deposit was
purchased by a bank n0 months after its date. It was issued "subject to the
rules of the Savings Department," as it showed on its face. It bore interest
if left 6 months, but interest was to cease one year from date. Held, the
certificate was negotiable and was taken by the bank in due course, since
(1) subjecting it to the rules of the Savings department did not make it payable out of a particular fund nor deprive it of the requisite certainty, (2)
although it was in effect a promissory note payable on demand, the reasonable
time within which it was required to be presented was indicated by the time
at which interest ceased, namely, 12 months from date. White v. Wadhams,
(Mich. 1918) 170 N. W. 6o.
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The first point here .decided, as to the effect of subjecting the certificate
of deposit to the rules of the savings department, is one .which does not seem
to have been heretofore passed upon by any court of the last resort. But the
decision is in harmony with the common financial practice. The second
point, that the termination of the running of interest fixes the time within
which it must be negotiated, is in accord with the general rule stated in the
books that interest bearing notes do not call for such prompt presentation as
demand paper which bears no interest. Daniel on Neg. Inst. (6th ed.) § 6rn;
Byles on Bills *2I3; Randolph on Commercial Paper, § I097. The case of
Kirkwood v. First National Bank, 40 Neb. 484, involved exactly the same
question upon a similar certificate of deposit, and the decision was the same.
CARRIER'S LIABILITY oN BILLS OF LADING FOR WHICH No Goons WERE DELIVERED-WHAT LAW GoVERNs.-The law's delays are not entirely of the past.
On Jan. 7th, I9I9, the United States Supreme Court pronounced what may be
the final judgment on an action arising in June, I9QO, M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Sealy, Adv. 0. I23. Defendant at first insisted that a Missouri shipment was
governed by Missouri and not Kansas law, the action having been brought
in Kansas. It was not until I9I3 that the defendant company cla,imed that the
transaction was governed by Federal law. This was doubtless due to the
fact that it was in that year tfiat the case of Adams E:rpress Co. v. Croninger,
226 U.
49I, decided that by the Carmack Amendment Congress had shown
its intent to take over the whole subject of limitation of liability by carriers
of goods in interstate shipments, and that therefore all state laws as to such
shipments were entirely superseded. The court held that the claim in this
case could not be maintained, because the Federal question was not seasonably
"raised, and also because the Carmack Amendment does not apply to a ship~
ment made six years before its passage. The Kansas court having three
times decided adversely to defendant, 78 Kan. 758, 84 Kansas 479, g8 Kan. 225,
the writ of error was dismissed.
As to the liability of the common carrier on fraudulent bills of lading,
issued without receipt of any goods, see I6 MICH·. LAW REv. 402, 4n. The
passage by Congress of the so-called Uniform Bill of Lading Act, the
Pomerene Act of August 29, I9I6, 39· Stat. at L. 538, has changed the common law rule, rigidly adhered to by about half the States and by the U. S.
Supreme Court, Shaw v. Ry., IOI U. S. 557, Friedlander v. Ry., I30 U. S.
4I6, in favor of the negotiability rule of Bank of Batavia v. R. R. Co., Io6
N. Y. I95, which made the carrier liable on a bill of lading to a bona fide
"holder for value, notwithstanding no goods were receiv.ed. As nearly half
the States have placed on their statute books this bill of lading act, the prevailing rule in fhe United States now accords with the New York rule, and
the decision of the Kansas court in the instant case. Plaintiff was allowed
·to recover of the carrier his advances on the bills of lading to the extent
they had not been repaid, notwithstanding the bills covered 27 carloads of
grain, not one bushel of which was ever shipped.

s:

CARRIER~S LIABILITY-WRITTEN NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.-That it
is lawful for a common carrier of goods to stipulate for complete freedom ·
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from liability, unless cl~im for damage is reported within a reasonable time
after the consignee has notice of the arrival of the goods, has been many
times held, from So. Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, to St. Louis, I. M.
6 S. R. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U: S. 592. If liability is to be claimed, it is only
fair that the carrier should know of the claim while it is still possible to investigate the alleged damage. And it is now held that it is not unreasonable
to require a written record of the claim. The case of So.
Co. v. Stewart,
U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 13, 1919, Adv. 0. l/'6, is one of the belated cases arising
under the Carmack Amendment of xgo6, and before the Cummins Amendment of March 4 1915. By this amendment interstate shipments after that
date will be subject to the ninety day limit there provided for.
The bill of lading in question covered a shipment of cattle, and required
claim for loss or damage to be made in writing within ten days after unloading the livestock. The Cummins Amendment makes unlawful any rule, contract or regulation for a shortt.r period for giving notice of claims than nir.ety
days, and for the filing of claims than four,months. But this shipment was
under the Carmack Amendment, and plaintiff admitted that he had made no
written claim within ten days. He denied that it was possible for him to
determine the damage in that time, and claimed waiver of ntltice by the carrier in attempting to adjust the claim. The court below charged that if the
defendant knew of the death of the cattle in transit as alleged in the complaint, then plaintiff was relieved from giving such notice as was required by
the contract. It has often been held thaLthere is no possible benefit to the
carrier in receiving written notice of what it already knows, Cockrill v. M.
K. & T. Ry. Co., 90 Kan. 650, and this rule was approved in the instant case,
both in the District Court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 233 Fed. 956.
The Supreme Court, however, holds that the requirement that such notice
be put in permanent form in writing is not unreasonable, and failure to do so
defeats plaintiff's recovery.
The rule requires written notice that c;:laims will be made, but allows to
plaintiff the necessary time to determine what the loss will be before he files
his bill for damages. By this rule the carrier escaped a liability for losses
which seem to have been caused by outrageous and willful conduct in handling the cattle, but the ultimate advantage to the carrier may be doubted. It is
such experiences as this on the part of the public that have caused much unfair legislation against the carrier, such for example as the ninety days ~e
quired by the Cummins Amendment. After the expiration of three months
with no notice of any claim it may be very difficult for the carrier to get the
facts, and juries have a way of believing the evidence submitted by the shipper. Jurymen themselves have often had experiences with such claims.
It is doubtful whether such decisions as that in Wells Fargo Exp. Co. v.
Townsend, Arkansas, June, 1918, 204 S. W. 417, can stand under the rule as
above laid down. In that case the court found that a letter from the claimagent suggesting that th·e shipper order a duplicate of the lost casting and
furnish claim covering the value of the original was a waiver of the stipulation for written notice.

Pac.
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C.o\RRIERS OF p ASS£NGERS-LU.UTATION OF LIABILITY-CARMACK A:.l£NDK£NT.-lt has often been held that a railroad company is not a common carrier, when it enters into a special contt'il.ct to transport a circus train, and
therefore a contract that the railroad company should not be responsible for
damages arising from want of care in running the cars, or otherwise, is valid.
Coup v. Wabash Ry. c(}., 56 Mich. III. It has also been held that in dealing
with human life the law will protect it equally whether the carriage is free,
or for compensation. P. & R. R. C(}. v. Derby, 14 How• .¢8. Many cases
have supposed that contracts limiting such liability were invalid, even in the
case of free passengers, Williams v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., I8 Utah 210, but
the weight of recent authority is the- other way. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Adams, 192 U. S. 440, reversing II6 Fed. 324- And such contracts have been
upheld in the case of express messengers, news agents and sleeping car porters.. B. & O. Ry. C(}. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498. This is based on the principle
that if a carrier is under no duty to carry, and may elect to refuse, then if
he does carry he may do it on such terms as he may consent to, and refuse
to carry unless he is released from assuming any liability for damages.
Nebraska is one ·of the states th'!-t refuses to permit this limitation, and in
Mancher v. C. R. I. and P. R. Co., 100 Neb. 237, held that notwithstanding
contracts signed by a circus employee releasing and exempting the employer
and the carrier from all c;aims for injuries however sustained, the carrier
was liable to such employee for injuries caused by the negligence of the engineer of a train following the circus train. The Nebraska court did not hold
that plaintiff, riding under this contract, was a passenger, but he was, at least,
a licensee. The contract affecting human life would be strictly construed, and
did not excuse the carrier from liability to one lawfully on the right of way
and injured by its negligence. The defendant sought to carry this to the
Federal court under the Carmack Amendment. But the United States
Supreme court, Jan. 7, 1919,.dismissed the. writ of error on, the gr6und that
the Carmack Amendment deals only with the. shipment of property. As to
limitation of liability in the carriage of passengers the States are still "free
to establish tht:ir own laws and policies and apply them to such contracts," in
accord with the· rule of Pa. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477.
Hm:e-PURCHASE AGRttH£NT~NVJ!RSION-M£ASUR£ OF DAHAGr:s.-One
Miss Nolan held a piano from p!aintiffs under a hire-purchase agreement,
with option to purchase on payment of the last installment; title to remain·
in the vendor until such payment had been made. After several ·installments
had been paid, Miss Nolan sold the piano to the defendant, making " a false
statutory declaration that the piano was her property." She subsequently
disappeared. Plaintiff sued in detinue and alternatively for conversion. The ·
defendant paid into court the sum of 181, the amount still due on the piano.
Held, plaintiffs entitled to judgment .or the return of the piano or the sum
of 281, its value. Whiteley, Limited v. Hilt, (1918), 2 K. B. us.
By a perfectly logical course ·of reasoning the court arrives at a correct
legal c;onclusion supported by the overwhelming weight of authority but hardly
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in accord with that sense of justice and fair dealing which we ordinarily attribute to "the man in the street." The court says that if :Miss Nolan had any
interest in the piano it must be by virtue of the agreement alone, and inasmuch as she had repudiated the agreement by the fraudulent sale, she had at the
date of the sale no interest in the piano which she could transfer to the defendant. This case is differentiated from Bclsi:;e Motor Supply Co. v. Cox,
(I9i4), I K. B. 244 and Donald v. Suckling, (I866),.L. R. l Q. B. 585, as in
these cases the act of the conditional vendee was an injustifiable repledge of the
chattel while in the instant case the act was a conversion and fraudulent sale.
The result of the decision is, however, that the plaintiff receh·es about one-third
more than the. value of his chattel and this at the expense of an innocent vendee
of the wrong doer, with the sorry consolation for the defendant that she has
a right of action against the absconder. If the verdict of the lower court had
been sustained, namely, that "the measure of damages was * * * the amount
of the hire-purchase money remaining unpaid" the plaintiff would ha\•e received full compensation for what· he had lost and the innocent defendant
would not have been punished for the fraudulent act of her vendor. This
conclusion is justified by the argument of the Ohio court in an analogous
case: "The wrong doer * * * [is] estopped from setting up any claim by
virtue of the wrong that he has done." 'Against the innocent purchaser from
the [wrong doer] the original owner still has "title" to his [property].'
But by virtue of what does he now have "title" to the [wrong doer's interest in
the property].' "The estopped, so to call it, .being created by fraud of
wrong, exists only against the one guilty of that fraud or wrong, which the
purchaser is not." Railway Co. v. Hutchins, (I877), 32 Oh. St. 584 Nevertheless the weight of authority is against the Ohio court (Cf. Bowles Wooden
Ware Co. v. United States, (I882), Io6 W. S: 4j2), and possibly the analogy
between the cases may be called in question, so our instant case is still law
whatever may be said. as to its justice.
HUSBAND AND WIF£-CONV£YA?:fC£ TO THEM CREATING "!'£NANCY IN CoM"J. W. and to her husband, A. W., and to their
heirs and assigns, as tenants in common, to have share and share alike."
After death of J. W., her husband having predeceased her, her heirs instituted
suit for partition, and a child of A. W. by a former marrrage intervened
claiming that as to one-half of the land the heirs of A. \V. were entitled.
Held, the devisees took as tenants in common and not as tenants by entireties.
God111a11 v. Greer, (Del.. Orphan's Court, 19I8) 105 Atl. 38o.
The court seemed to find
great deal· of difficulty in arriving at a conclusion the soundness of which cannot admit of much question. Even without the Married Women's Acts a conveyance to parties then husband and
wife did not inevitably create a tenancy by entireties. I Prestoii 011 Estates,
132; 2 Blackstone Comm. *182 (Sharswood's Note).-If Preston's view
lacked the support of decisions squarely in point, at least there were none
opposed ther!!tO. As pointed out in his· book, husband and wife were not so
much 011e that they could not during the marriage relation own land as
tenants in common. In this country there were a fe\~ decisions in which,

MON.-By devise land came to
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stressing the oneness of husband and wife too much, it was held no words
in a conveyance to husband and wife could prevent them taking as tenants
by entireties. Dias v. Glover, I Hoff. Ch. 7I (but see, contra, Hicks v.
Cochran,4 Edw. Ch. Io7); Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. St. 397. On the contrary
there were not lacking judicial declarations in accord with Preston's view.
McDermott v. FretJch, IS N. J.. Eq. 78; Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302, 310;
Brown v. Brown, 133 Ind. 476. Since the Married Women's Acts there cannot be any question left. Even in Pennsylvania it is now held that a conveyance to husband· anci wife may create a tenancy in common. Blease v.
Anderson, 24I Pa. St. I98.
INTr:RNATION.AI,

LAW-DIPLOMATIC

PRIVILEG~WAIVER

WITH

LEAVE

OF

Sovr:RnGN•.:.....Francisco Suarez died intestate in England in 1797 possessed
of considerable property. Plaintiff and defendant each claimed to be one of
the next-of-kin and entitled to share in the intestate's personality. In 1900
defendant obtained letters of administration and appointed plaintiff his attorney to collect moneys due to the estate abroad. In I914 plaintiff issued an
originating summons asking for an account and for the administration of the
personal estate by the Court. Service of summons was accepted by defendant's solicitors and an appearance entered in due course. The first hearing
was adj oumed to enable counsel to ascertain whether defendant intended
to claim privilege as Minister for Bolivia. Counsel informed· the Court
presently that defendant waived his diplomatic privilege. Later: defendant's ..
counsel wrote plaintiff's counsel that waiver of privilege had bee; -~utllorized ·
by the President of Bolivia. The order for administration was made. · Plaintiff appealed from the order, defendant gave notice of a cross-contention,
and the· order was varied to give effect to the contentions of both parties.
The accounts showed large sums due from defendant. Two sums were
· lodged in Court, one in pursuance to an order and the other ·voluntarily.
Defendant also submitted to be surcharged with a large suin to be paid in
instalments. He defaulted on the first instalment, and was personally served
with an order to attend before the Master for examination as to his means.
A supplemental order was made that defendant pay the entire amount into
Court. rhe next day he left the country. Plaintiff took out a summons for
leave to proceed to execution and to issue a writ of sequestration against the
property of defendant. The application ~as refused on the ground of defendant's diplomatic privilege. The summons was permitted to stand over,
however, with liberty to restore in the event of defendant ceasing to hold
diplomatic office. Four months later the British Foreign Office informed
plaintiff's counsel that defendant's appointment as Minis_ter had been terminated. Plaintiff restored his summons, his application · was granted, and
defendant appealed. It was argued for defendant that the Diplomatic Privileges Act of I7o8 made writ and process utterly null and void, and that a
waiver of privilege, even with the sovereign's consent, could not confer a
jurisdiction which did not exist. Held, that the order for the issue of .the
writ of sequestration was properly made. In re Suarez (1907), 87 L. J.
Ch. 173.
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Diplomats enjoy immunity from suit, even in cases where neither person
nor property are immediately affected. J.fagdale11a Steam /\"a;:igatio11 Co. \".
Martin (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 310. The immunity continues for a reasonable
time after termination of the appointment to enable the diplomat to hand
over the office to his successor and return to his country. J.!11s11rus Bes v.
Gadban (1894), 63 L. J. Q. B. 621. The report of !he Foreign Office as to
the status of foreign dignitaries and their representath-es is conclusi\·e.
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore (1893), 63 L. ]. Q'. B. 593 (status of foreign
sovereign); Foster v. Globe Venture S)•11dicate (1900), 69 L. ]. Ch. 375
(status and boundaries of foreign state). Lord Talbot's dictum that diplomatic immunity cannot be waived applies only to wah-er without leave of
the Sovereign. Sec Barbuit's Case (1737), Cas. t. Tall>. 281. The Diplomatic
Privileges Act of 17o8 is merely declaratory of the common law, of which
the law of nations is to be deemed a part. Triquet v. Bath (1764), 3 Burr.
Diplomatic privilege under the law of nations may be waived with the permission of the diplomat's Government. The opinion suggests that the
diplomat is the proper source of information with regard to this permission.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-REQUISITION BY FonEIGN SovEREIGN-IMM-t;:SITY
FROM PROCESS.-The "Roseric," a privately owned ship, collided with a barge
belonging to the libellants who subsequently attempted to enforce a lien
through process and seizure. The ·ship was released on bond. It appeared
from the statement of amici curiae (counsel for the British Embassy) that
at the time of the collision the ship was requisitioned as a British transport
and that the arrest would "interfere with the government business upon
which.said vessel is engaged." Held, that by rule of comity the vessel was
exempt during its requisition. To permit the arrest would be inconsistent
with the dignity and independence of sovereignty which must not be "hampered or interfered with in tbe use of such instrumentalities." . The "Roseric,"'
254 Fed. 854 (Dist. Ct. D., New Jersey, 1918).
The court refused to be led by tl1e per curiam opinion in The "Att11a/ita,"
238 Fed. 909, which did not recognize immunity for a ship in the employment
of the Italian government, on the ground that the Italian government would
not be liable for the wrong done by the vessel. That court failed to realize
the haz;ird of preferring a local claim for damages over the public purpose
of a foreign sovereign. As a rule the municipal courts are extremely careful to uphold the foreign sovereign in the protection of its public purposes
as against the local demands for private redress. In The "Parlc111c11t Beige,"'
Ct. of Appeals, L. R. 5 Prob. Div. 197, the proceeding was in rem against a
public mail-packet of the Belgian government. It was argued by the claimants that a proceeding in rem was against the vessel only and not against
the sovereign. The court, however, realized that the property must be considered as property belonging to someone. The municipal principle as to
proceedings in rem had to give way when the owner was a foreign sovereign.
It could not be supposed that the sovereign was not indirectly impleaded.
To attempt to exercise such authority would be "inconsistent with the independence and equality of the· state which is represented by such .owne.r."
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The court went even farther and said that the declaration of the sovereign
that the vessel was public "cannot be inquired into." In The "Davis," IO Wall.
(U. S.), 15, an action in rem was allowed against a shipment of cotton, the
property of the United States, on board a private vessel, since the property
was not in the possession· of the United States and process would not
have to be issued against it. c. H. Weston in an article in 32 HARV. LAW
Riw., called "Actions Against the Property of Sovereigns" (Jan. 1919), at
p. :266, assails the "possession" test and suggests the test of public purpose.
He brings an analogy from the law of municipal corporations whose property
is not exempt wh~ owned for profit but is exempt when charged with a
public purpose, viz., hospitals, fire engines, etc. No issue can be taken with
the proposition that the property of the sovereign which is charged with a
public purpose should be exempt from local process. But if he means to
make the local courts the judges of the publjc purposes of sovereigns there
can be no appfoval. The inevitable and. accepted view is presented in
Weston's paraphrase of the holdings of the courts on this question: "Sovereign authority would shrink to limall proportions if not permitted to determine what uses of its property are public. To inquire into the use ot
"Property declared by a foreign sovereign to be public would be to flout the
dignity of sovereignty which the courts have declared entitled· to respect." It
may be added that it would not only flout the dignity of sovereignty hut
would also "endanger the performance of the public duties of the sovereign."
Briggs v. Lightboats, 93 Mass. (II Allen) 157· The court in the principal
however, attempts to include the ease within the rule of The "Davis,"
supra, by saying that the offii;ers and crew became for the time being "the
sovereign's instrumentalities and whatever possession of the ship they obtained by reason of this employment was the sovereign's possession while
the requisition was in force." This reasoning is hardly necessary if the
sovereign once declares the ship bound on a public purpose. ·But the decision
is correct and the general principles governing it are unquestionably sound.
.See· also V avasseur v. Krupp, 9 Ch. D. 351; The "Exchange," II U. S. (7
Cranch) u6; The "Broadmayne,'' L. R. [1916] Prob. Div. 64

case,

NEGLIGSNct-SuscoNTRACTOR's DuTY TO MAINTAIN SAFE CoNDITIONSINJURitS TO THIRD PasoNs.-Defendant h;td a contract with a building corporation to install the ornamental iron work in a certain building. This included the installation of the steel ·work of the inside stairways exclusive. <Jf
the marble treads whicq were necessary to make the stairway complete. The
proof showed that it was the universal custom as the construction progressed to use these staircases with the iron tread for workmen going up and
'down the building; and that the defendant had full knowledge of such
actual use in this building. An employee of another contractor doing'
masonry work upon the building stepped upon a tread of one of these stairs,
which' fell by reason of the fact that it had not been properly bolted as it
should have been. The action is for resulting injuries due to the alleged
negligence of the defendant.. H efd, that the plaintiff could not recover because the defendant owed him no duty to make the stairway safe. "The
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obligation did not rest upon the defendant to produce a stairway safe for
tra\·el, but merely that portion of a stairway which, wheJI compelted by the
work of someone else, would be a safe means of travel." Smith and Clarke,
J. J., (dissenting) held that the defenqant owed a duty to those who to his
knowledge would make use of the stairway. Brady\". Clare111011t Iron 1Vorks
(Supreme Ct. of New York, App. Div., Jan. 1919), 174 N. Y. Supp. 64
In Heaven v. Pender, Ct. of Appeal, II Q. B. D. 503, an opposite conclusion ·was reached under facts materially similar to those in the principal case.
The defendant, a dock owner, under a contract with a ship owner, supplied a
stage to be slung outside the ship for the purpose of painting. The contractee"s employee was allowed a recovery against the dock ownu for injuries caused by the breaking. of a defective rope. The defend:int had no
actual knowledge that the platform would be used by the plaintiff but the
court concluded that he •·must have known" if the matter had been considered at all. The court refused to limit the defendant's duty to the parties to
the contract. The court said: ·•If a person contracts with another to use ordinary care or skill toward him or his property the obligation need not be considered in the light of a duty; it is an obligation of contracf. It is undoubted,
howe,·er, that there may be the obligation of such a duty from one person to
another although there is no contract between them with regard to such
duty * * * the existence of a contract between two persons does not.'
prevent the existence of the suggested duty between. them also being raised
by !aw. independently of the contract, by facts in regard to which the contract
is made and to which it applies an exactly similar but ·not a contract duty."
In a word, the existence of a contract duty does not preclude the existence
of a duty ex delicto contemporaneous with it and covering the same or a
broader field. The ntle laid down by the court is, indeed, a reasonable one:
''Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with
regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at
once recoF"nize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger.or injury
to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and
skill to avoid such danger." The same rule is expressed in Sweeny v. Old
Colony Ry., IO Allen· (Mass.) 368, 377. In the principal case the duty to the
plaintiff seems clear. The knowledge of the future use imposed upon the
defendant a duty to construct an uncompleted stairway as safe as an uncompleted stairway of that type should be-especially sinee no greater burden
was imposed than that which the contract with the building corporation imposed, namely that due care be exercised in the construction of the stairway.
The case would have been easily covered by the principle laid down in McPlzerso1i v. Buick ]fofOI' Co., 217 N. Y. 382, decided in the Court of Appeals
in the same jurisdiction. See also Huset v. Case Threshing Maclzi11c Co.,
I.20 Fed. 865; Schubert v. Clark, 49 Minn. 331, and the cases discussed in the
opinions 'of the .principal case.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-LIABILITY OF

DRAWJ;R

OF

BLANK

CHECK.-

Plaintiff signed a check made out by his confidential clerk. At the time, it
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purported to be made Ot!t in figures for 2£, although nothing was writter.
upon it in words. The figure 2 was so placed, however, that a figure l could
~e placed before it and a o after it. The clerk thus raised the figures to
120£, filled in words for that amount, cashed the check and absconded.
Plaintiff sued for a declaration that the bank on which the check was drawn
had no right to debit plaintiff's account by more than the 2£ for which the
check was drawn when signed. Held, the bank was entitled to debit the
full 120£. London Joint Steck Bank v. Macmillan and Arthur, H. of L.,
[1918] 1918 Ann. Cas. 777.
The court recognized two issues, namely, whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in signing the check as '1e did, and whether such negligence
was a breach of duty between himself and the bank. Both issues were
decided in the affirmative. The ultimate decision was based also on the
principle that plaintiff was estopped to deny the authority of his ag~nt to
fill in as "he did what was practically a blank check when signed. In Commercial Bank v. Arden, 177 Ky. 520 is was held that inasmuch as the Negotiable Instrument statute of Kentucky made void instruments which had
been altered without the maker's consent, the maker owed no duty to the
bank to use care in drawing instruments so that they could not be alteredan apparent non-sequitur. Most of the American authorities, however, are
in harmony with the principal decision and impose upon the drawer of a
check a duty to use due care in protecting the drawee. Otis Elevator Co. v.
First National Bank, 163 Cal. 31; Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 100 N. Y.
S. 497. The. principal case, in its recital of the various interpretations of
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, is an interesting commentary on the mechanics
of the law.

N UISANCl';-FEAR-TUBttcutos1s HoSPITAr.-REsTRICTIVr: CoVl';N ANTS.Lands were leased with covenant by the lessee not to "exercise or carry on,
or permit to be used, exercised, or carried on, upon the demised premises
any noisy, noisome, or offensive trade or business, or use any part of the
premises as a tavern or inn, or at any time during the term do or suffer to
lie done anything which might be hazardous or noisome or injurious or
offensive to the" lessor of his property, or to any of bis tenants or undertenants." The lessee turned over the demised premises to be used as a
hospital for children suffering from surgical tuberculosis. On application by
plaintiffs as neighboring owners and entitled to the beilefit of such covenant.
Held, the covenant was not violated and no nuisance committed or thr~atened.
Frost_ v. The King Edward, etc. Assoc., (Ch. Div.), [1918] 2 Ch. 18o.
The injunction was asked on the ground that "tuberculosis is an endemic
and infectious disease. am;l the hospital is a source of danger to the neighborhood." After hearing testimony of eminent authorities whose conclusions
were aU- to the effect that the hospital was not a source of danger to the
neighborhood and that there was no risk of infection from it to those living
in its immediate vicinity, the court concluded as above stated. The fears of
those in the neighborhood were found to be groundless. In Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kans: 86, an injunction against the establishment of a cancer hospital
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in a residence district was upheld. The court said: "The question is not
whether the establishment of the hospital would place the occupants of the
adjacent dwellings in actual danger of infection, but whether they would
have reasonable ground to fear such a result, and whether, in view of the
general dread inspired by the disease, the reasonable enjoyment of their
property would not be naturally interfered with by the bringing together of
a considerable number of cancer patients in this place." To the same general
effect are Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 :Md. 352, where the placing of a
l«;per for care and restraint in a residence neighborhood .was enjoined;
Everett. v. Paschall, 6I Wash. 47, where it was held, partly, at least, under
the influence of a statute, that the operation of a sanitarium for the treatment
of pulmonary tuberculosis in a residence neighborhood was restrained, fear,
very real though unfounded and unreasonable, on the part of the neighbors
being considered sufficient to make out a case for relief. In .this connection
the statement by LoRD HARDWICK£ in Anon., 3 Atk. 750, that "the fears of
mankind, though they may be reasonable ones, will not create a nuisance,"
is interesting. Board of Health v. North American Home, 77 N. J. Eq. 464,
very like the principal case in the character of disease treated, is in accord
therewith.
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT RULE AS AGAINST THE
CoMPANY.-Webster in his dramatic appeal which suffused with tears the
eyes of the great Chief Justice, and led to the decision in the Dartmo11tli
College Case, 4 Wheat. 526, that a corporate charter is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impairecl--without violating the constitution of the
United States, saw only his beloved college, "one of the lesser lights in the
literary horizon," which an adverse decision.might put out. It is safe to say
that neither he nor the Chief Justice, nor anyone else present on that occasion
saw in the sweep of that decision how relatively insignificant on that day
were the interests of Dartmouth College, gr "all those great lights of science
which for more than a century have thrown their radiance over our land."
Actually that decision was of small moment to Dartmouth College, or to all
the other educational institutions of the land. It was of tremendous importance in other directions not dreamed of by the actors in that historic
scene. It came into full vigor only when the decision of Mmm v. Illi11ois,
94 U. S. II3, made way for' regulatory measures by states and municipalities
over public utilities. As a result not a few of these have found themselves
incumbered and embarrassed by contract rights and privileges freely and
easily, and sometimes corruptly, granted to public service corporations by
one generation, which the next would fain restrict or withdraw. Especially
has this been the case with provisions as to the charges to be paid by the
public for the service.
These agreements were often between the utilities and municipal and other
subordinate bodies politic. Recent decisions that rate making is a legislative
function that might be lodged with a municipality, but only by specific terms
showing such grant, have enabled municipalities to· escape restrictions they
had assumed without this grant of power, and they have been glad to take
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advantage of the way of escape from the burdensome agreements of their
representatives. Milwaukee Electric Ry. Co. v. R.R. Com. of Wis., 238 U. S.
174 So long as the rate revision was downward the public enjoyed the rule.
But chidcens tend to come home to roost, and this rule allowing a legislature
to override an agreement made by a municipality is doing it. The last two
years has seen an unprecedent upward turn in the curve of prices and rates.
Federal commissions are permitting increases of state-fixed rates, 16 MICH.
L. Rr:v. 379, and stat_e commissions are raising municipality-fixed rates. This
revision upward, in the face of charter agreements, is not so agreeable to the
public. The Supreme Court in Englewood v. Denver and South Platte Ry.
Co., U. S. Adv. 0., Jan. 7, 1919, page 149, upheld the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court "that this town, at least, deriving its powers from legislative
grant, could make no contract of this sort that was not subject to control
by the legislature; that the Public Utilities Commission had been authorized
by the legislature to regulate the matter in controversy; that it had done so;
and that this proceeding should be dismissed." The result is that many
municipalities seem to be in a position where their charter contract with
public utilities is valid against, but not for them. The war conditions may
soon pass, but if not the bigger question is not far away, viz., the effect
against the state itself of charter provision as to rates which do not yield a
fair return, or any return, on the value of the property devoted to a public
use. Whatever agreements may have been made, public utilities cannot be
permanently operated at a loss. What will become of these charter-fixed
rates?
PU11Lic OFFICERs--R:r:cess :APPoINTMENT-LIMITATioN oN ExECunvii's
PowER.-The governor of Pennsylvania forwarded to the state senate the
name of Daniel F. Lafean for Col}firmation as commissioner of banking for
the regular term. The senate rejected the nomination and shortly after the
final adjournment of that body the governor appointed Lafean to fill the
vacancy in the office and to serve until. the end of the next session of the
senate. Lafean entered on the duties of his office, and the payment of the
salary being refused him brought mandamus to compel the auditor general
and state treasurer to approve and pay him the salary attached by law to the
office. The- defendants appealed from the decision Qf the trial court awarding a peremptory writ and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with a court
divided four to three, affirmed the decision. Commonwealth ex rel Lafean
v. Snyder, (Pa., 1918), 104 Atl. 494.
The constitution of Pennsylvania co.ntained the following common state
constitutional provisions: The Governor "shall nominate, and, by and with
the advice and consent of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate,.appoint * * * such * * * officers of the commonwealth as he is or
may be authorized by the Constitution or law, to appoint; he shall have the
power to fill all vacancies that may happen, in offices to which he may appoint,
during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire
at the end of their next session; * * * if the vacancy shall happen during
the session of the Senate, the Governor shall nominate to the Senate, before
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their final adjournment, a proper person to fill said vacancy." A majority of
the court reasoned that the constitution expressly authorized the governor to
fill vacancies happening during the recess of the senate and did not expressly
place any restriction on his choice in making such a ·temporary appointment.
They refused to find that any such restriction was to be implied from the
constitution. The minority judges dissented on the ground that the constitution by implication prevented the governor from appointing to office, for any
portion of the term thereof, a person whom tlie senate had rejected for appointment to the same office for the full term. The majority opinion mentions but does not discuss the point as to when the vacancy occurred. There
is slight authority to the effect that where a vacancy occurs before the adjournment of the senate, it is not a vacancy happening during the recess of
the senate or, in other words, the office does not become vacant during the
recess. People \". Forquer (1825), l Ill. 104 Other courts have taken the
opposite and better view and held that though the vacancy first occu; red
during the session of the senate, it continues to exist or '"happen" until filled,
and the power of recess appointment therefore embraces the power to fill
temporarily a vacancy which existed when the senate was in session and for
some reason was not filled. Jn re Farrow (186o)} 3 Fed. 112; State v. Kulil
(1889), 51 N. J. L. 191. It is therefore entirely probable that had this point
been decided by the court in the instant case it would have been settled that
the vacancy "happened" during the recess of the senate and the governor's
power of appointment would have been upheld. On the main point discussed
by the court in the instant case the majority of the court appear to have been
right. The governor's power to nominate and, by and with the advice and
consent of the senate, to appoint a person to fill .an office for the full tenn is
entirely separate and distinct from the governor's power of recess appointment. The mere fact that the two powers are conferred by the same section
of the constitution furnished ho reason for limiting one by the other. Nothing in the language of the section conferring these powers creates an implication that the governor's power of choice in making a recess appointment is
limited by the senate's approval or disapproval of the person seleded. As
shown in the majority opinion 'in the instant case, the implication contended
for by the minority judges is so doubtful that it has been found necessary to
insert in many state constitutions express provisions to secure the same effect
sought to be obtained by the implication contended for in this case. The
power of the executive to appoint to office, during the recess of the senate,
to fill a vacancy and sen·e until· the end of the next session, a person who has
been rejected for appointment to the same office for the regular term by the
senate before its adjournment has been the subject of much speculation. This
seems to be the first case in which the point is squarely decided.
SALES-RIGHT TO RESCINO FOR BRE.\CH 01' \VARR.\NTY.-Action to rescind
the sale of an auto truck for breach of warranty. Held, Appellee by using
the truck a year, though intermittently complaining of defects, had waived his
right to rescind. lllternatio11al Haroester Co. of America \". Brown (Ky.
1918), 2o6
w. 622.

s.
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In deciding that appellee had waived his right to rescind, the court necessarily assumes the right to have existed subsequent to the sale. By the weight
of authority in this country and England, the rule on the right of a purchaser
to rescind a sale on breach of warranty is as stated in Thornton v. Wynn, 12
Wheat. 184 and Street v. Blay, 2 B. & A. 456, wherein it was held that no
such right existed in cases where title had passed to the vendee unless there
had been fraud, or unless the right was given by breach of a condition subsequent. See 16 HARV. L. REY. 465, where the cases are collected and commented on by Professor Williston. Opposed to this is the case of Bryant v.
Ishberg, 13 Gray 007, where the court came to the conclusion that * * *
"a warranty may be treated as a condition subsequent at the election of the
vendee, who may, upon a breach thereof.rescind the contract and recover back
the amount of his purchase money as in case of fraud." As to the status,
strength and respective merit of the conflicting views in our courts, see a
running discussion between Professors Williston and Burdick in 4 CoL. L.
Rr:v. 2, 194, 265, wherein the former ably supports the Massachusetts rule and
the latter strongly contends for the law of Street v. Blay. The instant case
fails to state ex~iicitly the court's conception of the stand taken by the Kentucigr courts on the question. Inferentially it holds to the right to ·rescind.
In the case of Lightburn v. Cooper, ,l Dana (31 Ky.) 273, the court decided
that "a simple warranty !ind tender even though there has been a breach of
the warranty, cannot operate as a rescission." No subsequeqt cases have been
~ound overruling this case. Cases cited by the court in the instant case,
where the right to return the "goods was considered, contained provisions for
rescission on breach of warranty. Dick v. Clark Jr. Electric Co., 161 Ky. 622;
McCormick v. Arnold, n6 Ky. 5o8, or for replacement of any and all defective
parts, Meek Coal Ge. v. Whitcomb Co., 164 Ky. 833; or, as in Yeiser et al. v.
Russell & Cc., 26 Ky. L. Rep. n51, the breach went to a condition and was'
waived by retention of the goods. Unless, therefore, there was some provision
in the contract of sale for returning the goods on breach of warranty omitted
from the report of the case under discussion, the court's assumption that such
right existed in Kentucky, was fallacious. Under the rule of Lightburn v.
Ccoper, the court would have arrived at the same conclusion on the ground
that a mere breach of warranty and tender would not operate to revest the
title in the seller, or if the matter be considered -as breach of a condition, the
acceptance and use beyond the time necessary for inspection would be deemed
a waiver of the right to rescind and the vendee would be put to his action for
damages for breach of warranty.
TRADE-MARKS-IND:EPENDEN't Oa1G1NATORS.-Complainant had built up, in
Massachusetts and to a certain extent throughout the Union, a business which
used the trade-mark "Rex" for medical· preparations. Defendant, unaware
of this, used the same word as a trade-mark for similar goods and had built
up a local business in Kentucky. Complainant sued to restrain defendant from
further use of the_ trade-nia~k ;'Re:it" on the ground that it was an infringement Held, the decree of the District Court should be reversed and an in-
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junction denied. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., (Dec. 1918)
39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48.
It was settled that,complainant had been the first to use "Rex" as a trademark, but that defendant adopted it in ignorance of complainant's use. The
patentee of an invention can restrain others from using his invention regardless of his own use or neglect to use. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
etc. Co., 210 U. S. 405. The fact that the infringer of a patent monopoly believed himself to be the originator of the idea (U.S. v. Berdam Co., 156 U. S.
552, 566) or that he did not know the idea was patented, is immaterial. Royer
v. Coupe, 29 Fed. 358. Cemplainant contended that the first originator of a
'trade-mark is entitled to its exclusive use wherever his business comes into
competition with others, citing Columbia .Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 46o,
et al. The gist of the decision in the principal case was, that adoption of a
trade-mark secures no monopoly whatever, but merely creates a right in
respect to a business; that where there is no business there is no right; and
th4t defendant, having first built up the business to which the right appertained in the particular locality, had the prior right in that locality. It seems
settled that there must be an actual use of the trade-mark to give any right
to it. HOPKINS ON TRADE-MARKS, sec. 29. That territorial rights, as between
originating claimants, depend on actual territorial use is supported by Hano'l!cr
Milling Co. v. Metca.lf, 240 U. S. 403, 4I5; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Weintraub,
196 Fed. 957.
V£NU£ OF ACTIONS-LOCAL ACTIONS AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.Two counties, King and Pierce, undertook the improvement of a river, and by
reason of their atleged negligence the property of a riparian owner in Pierce
county was inju~ed. The owner sued both counties in the court- of Pierce
county. Held, on objection by King county, that the action was brought in
the proper place. State ex rel v. Superior Court (Wash. I9I8), I76 Pac.
Rep. 352.
The question was one of precedence between two rules, (r) that a municipal corporation must be sued in its own courts, and (2) that a local action
must be brought where the -wrongful act takes place. Here King .county was
being sued in Pierce county for a trespass to real {>r~perty which occurred in
the county of venue. The court held that a general rule of venue should be
deemed to apply to municipal corporations as well as individuals unless they
were expressly excepted. The statute fixing the venue for trespass to real
property did not except counties, hence they were like individuals subject to
suit where the injury took place.
This is the general rule. In McBane v. People, 50 Ill. 5o6, a general statute
on change of venue was held to authorize carrying an action out of the
defendant county, notwithstanding that by the terms of a special statute it
could have been commenced only in the defendant's courts. In Clarke v.
Lyons County, 8 Nev. 18I, a general statute authorizing trial in a wrong
venue where timely objections were not taken, was held to apply to counties.
In Baltimore City v. Turnpike Cpmpany, 104 Md. 351, an action for trespass
committed-by a city upon land outside the city was held properly brought in
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the jurisdiction where the land was located. The rule exemplified in these
cases offers an inferesting illustration of the strength of the local venue tradition of the common law,-a tradition which Lord Mansfield unsuccessfully
tried to revise upon the principle that only proceedings in rem were essentially
local. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 ; Erskine's argument in Dou/son v.
Matthews, 4 T. R. 503. An action against a county of one State brought in
the courts of another State, where the process of attachment is available
would seem to present no difficulty. Van Ham v. Kittitas County, 28 Misc.
(N. Y.) 333, affirmed, 46 N. Y. App. Div. 623.
W1LLS-EX£CUTORY D£VIS£-R£PUGNANCY-FAILUR£ OF PMCE:DING lNT£R-

£ST.-Testatrix by will gave her freeholds absolutely to A. "subject to the
following bequests. * * * Secondly I desire that after my executor's
(A's) death whatever of my freehold properties shall remain shall be given
to" a named charity. Held, that if A had survived the testatrix the gift to
the charity would have been repugnant and void and that A would have taken
absolutely, but that, A having died in the lifetime of the testatrix, the doctrine
of repugnancy did not apply, and the gift to the charity was accelerated and
took effect.. In re Dunstan. Dunstan v. Dunstan, [1918] 2 Ch. 304Where property is given by will to a,_ devisee absolutely, any further disposition of such property is generally ineffective. A provision that if the
first taker does not give· the property away in his life-time or dispose of it
by will, it shall not go to his heir-at-law or personal representative is repugnant and void; for what is once vested absolutely in a man cannot be
taken from him out of the course of devolution at his death by any expression
or wish on the part of the testator. It may happen, however, that the
original gift never takes effect,-e. g., through the death of the devisee or
legatee in the lifetime of the testator. The older cases made no exception in
this situation. In 1855 Sir John Romilly, M. R., held that an executory bequest over in defeasance of a previous absolute bequest of personalty failed
although the first legatee predeceased the testator. Hughes v. Ellis, 20 Beav.
193. The same view had been taken in Andrew v. Andrew, (1845) 1 Coll.
686 (consumable articles), and Harris v. Davis (1844) 1 Coll. 416, 9 Jur.
269; Hughes v. Ellis was followed in Created v. Created (1859) 26 Beav.
621. These cases were deservedly criticised by James, L. J., in In re Stringer's
Estate (1877) 6 Ch. Div. 1, 14-15. As Justice James said, it is difficult to
see why this principle should apply to a case "where the original gift never
did take effect at all, because there is no repugnance. There may be repugnance between the gift over and the gift intended to be made, but I
am not quite sure that that ought to be applied to a case, supposing the
point arose, where there was simply the death of the person creating a
lapse." So far as bequests of personalty are concerned, the modern doctrine
was established in In re Lowman [1895] 2 Ch. 348. Lindley, L. J., said:
" * * * _where there are successive limitations of personal estate in
favour of several persons absolutely, the first of them who survives the
testator takes absolutely, although he would have taken nothing if any other
legatee had survived and taken ; or in other words, in the case supposed
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lhe effect of the failure of an earlier gift is to accelerate, and not destroy,
the later gift. * * * The doctrine of repugnancy has no application to
gifts that fail; the doctrine does not come into operation until somebody
takes, and it is only those limitations which defeat the interest some one
takes that are :void, on the ground that they are inconsistent with what is
given to him." Lindley, L. J., expressly limited his decision to personal
estate. The question therefore remained whether the same principle would
apply to devises of land. The dictum of James, L. J., applied alike to land
realty and personalty and Mr. Sweet expressed the opinion that when the
point arose with regard to realty the courts would hold it subject to the same
rule. I ]ARMAN, WILLS (ed. 6) 452. This problem seems to have been
presented for the first time in -the principal case. Neville, J., held that no
sound distinction could be drawn between real and personal estate and did
not hesitate to extend the doctrine of In re Lowman to real estate. The
passing of another futile distinction is pleasant to record.

